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Extrospectives: Civilization is not something absolute

Posted 5/5/22

Few words are more malleable, combustible, or contested than “culture.” Yet in the supposedly global village of a post-Internet world, this versatile term may help us understand some of the most

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Extrospectives: Civilization is not something absolute

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Few words are more malleable, combustible, or contested than “culture.” Yet in the supposedly global village of a post-Internet world, this versatile term may help us understand some of the most persistent dichotomies that still divide societies.

Contemporary anthropology uses the term culture to describe a wide variety of phenomena and behaviors that transmit through human societies. It includes performative disciplines like art, music, literature, and religion but also encompasses abstractions like social or political organization.

Originally derived from the writings of Cicero in ancient Rome, the meaning of the term has morphed considerably over time as the semiotics surrounding it evolved.

For centuries culture was used to contrast more complex, “civilized” societies from less complex, “primitive” ones, often to justify conquest or colonial subjugation.

In his 1997 book Guns Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, Jared Diamond argued explicitly against this interpretation of the enduring hegemony of Eurasian and North African civilizations. Rejecting the idea that some societies are inherently superior on moral, intellectual, or genetic terms, Diamond argued that gaps in power and technology between human societies are caused instead by environmental differences.

Culture has also served as a proxy for class associations, illuminating the differences that separate elites from “common” people.

In his 2014 book Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Yuval Noah Harari suggests that humans came to dominate the planet because they are the only animal capable of large-scale cooperation. Harrari posits that this ability arises from our unique capacity to collectively employ imaginary abstractions – gods, nations, and money – that help propagate culture.

While this distinctive capacity for fiction enabled explosive population growth, Harari contends that quality of life for non-elite people diminished as these imaginary systems expanded. More provocatively, he argues that political, economic, and religious belief systems inherently foster discrimination. And in keeping with the tenor of the times, Harari suggests that this dynamic implies it is impossible to have an unbiased society.

Some societies explicitly embrace multiculturalism, which emphasizes peaceful coexistence and mutual respect between cultures. Other societies embrace monoculturalism – the belief that the traditions and values of a dominant ethnic group are inherently superior to those of minority groups and should therefore prevail.

Monoculturalism is often correlated with autocracies and hereditary class structures. It is a kissing cousin of ethnocentrism, in which societies (like the colonial European powers or Imperial Japan) judge the merit of another culture only by the yardstick of their own standards and values.

A textbook example of ethnocentrism recently was Vladimir Putin’s assertion that Ukraine has no discrete culture to speak of and is therefore a natural fiefdom of the greater Russo-Slavic civilization, not a true nation.

Multiculturalism is associated with liberal democracies that emphasize economic and social mobility, lenient immigration policies, and tolerance for religious and ethnic diversity.

Contrary to the experience of those centered within post-WWII America, it’s worth noting that multiculturalism was an anomaly in most periods of human history and that among contemporary nations only a minority fit comfortably under that label.

The US was the global standard bearer for multiculturalism in the late 20th century. More recently, the libertarian-nativist-MAGA coalition that consumed the GOP has asserted a national identity that is more explicitly Christian and Caucasian.

This ethnocentric interpretation of American history is a reversion to the mean – at least for conservatives. The pre-WWII GOP of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge identified itself as the party of low taxes, economic protectionism, restricted immigration, aversion to foreign entanglements, and religious piety. Aside from glaring differences in their personalities and tolerance for deficits, Calvin Coolidge and Donald Trump shared many populist and nativist beliefs.

The core characteristics of multiculturalism are ultimately the byproduct of an anthropological theory called cultural relativism – which argues that the norms and values of one culture cannot be evaluated or ranked against the norms and values of another. Cultural relativism is the wellspring from which dozens of academic disciplines, political movements and policy narratives have emanated, including some of the most divisive issues of today.

If the loosely defined philosophy currently derided as “wokeness” has a godfather, it would be the German- born American anthropologist, Franz Uri Boas. Boas joined Columbia University as an anthropology professor in 1899 and went on to become a prominent opponent of the burgeoning field of scientific racism. Boas worked tirelessly to demonstrate that race was not a biological concept, and that differences in behavior are largely the result of cultural preferences acquired through social learning, rather than innate biological traits.

Boas influenced the development of anthropology in America. Several of his students founded anthropology departments at other schools. Among the most famous of his disciples were Zora Neale Hurston and Margaret Mead.

If wokeness had a godmother, it would be Margaret Mead. Mead’s most controversial work, Coming of Age in Samoa, prominently detailed Polynesian attitudes toward sexuality and significantly influenced the American sexual revolution of the 1960s.

Contrasting Polynesian and Asian societies with the Christian cultures that dominated America during her upbringing, Mead argued that attitudes about sexuality, gender, and child- rearing were products of cultural transmission rather than biological or moral absolutes.

Though she never identified publicly as lesbian or bisexual, Mead’s personal life would place her in the LGBTQ community today. In writings and speeches, she argued that an individual’s sexual orientation should be expected to evolve throughout a lifetime.

A direct line can be traced from Franz Boas’ work combating scientific racism to the anti-racism advocated by proponents of Critical Race Theory today. Likewise, Margaret Mead’s advocacy for broader, more fluid sexual and gender conventions presaged the hyper-individualism we now label identity politics.

Many in our society applaud the momentum that Boas’ and Mead’s ideas have achieved in America, but cultural relativism, inevitably, is a double-edged sword. Some societies outside the US reject categorically our evolving views on sex, race, and gender, for reasons deeply rooted in their religious and cultural legacies. Cultural relativism requires us to acknowledge those opposing value systems as equally valid.