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Extrospectives: Party like it’s 1989

Posted 3/10/22

On November 3, 1989, the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “perestroika” movement and the bureaucratic bungling of East Germany’s Socialist Party leadership culminated in the dismantling of the

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Extrospectives: Party like it’s 1989

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On November 3, 1989, the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “perestroika” movement and the bureaucratic bungling of East Germany’s Socialist Party leadership culminated in the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. Vladimir Putin, an ambitious 37-year-old foreign intelligence officer for the KGB, was stationed in East Germany at the time.

Putin had a front row seat as the “Iron Curtain” surrounding Eastern Europe collapsed. The Iron Curtain was a defining feature of the Cold War, and it is difficult for younger people to understand how profoundly the Eastern Bloc was isolated by it. Emigration to the West was not allowed. Economic trade was embargoed. Western media were censored.

Gorbachev’s efforts to reform the USSR from within uncorked tides of passion that could not be controlled. From 1989 to 1991, Communist governments in Albania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and East Germany were overthrown.

In August 1991 Communist hardliners attempted to depose Gorbachev. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his populist coalition defied tanks in a televised standoff that neutralized support for the coup.

On December 1, 1991, Ukraine held a referendum on seceding from the USSR. Over 90% voted for independence.

On December 8, the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belovezh Accords, creating a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Two weeks later, eight republics joined Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in executing the Alma-Ata Protocol, which declared each signatory a sovereign state and that the CIS would replace the Soviet Union. Four days later, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned and conveyed his presidential powers, including control of Soviet nuclear weapons, to Boris Yeltsin.

Putin left the KGB in 1991 to pursue a political career in his native St. Petersburg. His tenure as a regional politician was marked by mafia-style corruption. In 1996 he moved to Moscow to work for the Yeltsin Administration.

In 1999, Yeltsin’s health deteriorated rapidly and his ability to govern Russia faltered. Divided by their own personal ambitions, his lieutenants vetted potential replacements, seeking a candidate who was not beholden to any faction. They wanted an heir who would honor Yeltsin’s legacy as the father of Russia’s fledgling democracy. Above all, they sought a younger politician whom they could influence.

Catastrophically, they chose Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. In one of the most consequential con jobs in history, Putin portrayed himself as a champion of liberalization. Defying term limits and accusations of election fraud, he has effectively ruled Russia ever since.

As Russia prepared to invade Ukraine this year Western pundits conjectured extensively about Putin’s goals. His prior actions and statements provide ample clarity.

For Vladimir Putin, the dissolution of Soviet power that began in 1989 is one of the great tragedies in human history. Domestically, his tenure has been dedicated to reconstructing the authoritarian state that Gorbachev, Yeltsin and “Western meddlers” like the IMF and World Bank dismantled. Diplomatically, his reign has consistently focused on reassembling the Soviet sphere of influence via force, economic leverage and brinksmanship.

The Warsaw Pact dissolved with the USSR, sparking concerns about nuclear security. In 1991, 1,700 warheads (30% of the Soviet arsenal) were deployed in the Ukraine, officially controlled by the CIS. After considerable Western lobbying - including foreign aid conditioned on working with the International Atomic Energy Agency to secure nuclear assets - Ukraine agreed to destroy its warheads. Ukrainians may now regret that decision.

Many contemporary notions about the arc of history bending away from militarism naïvely disregard its true lessons. The largest land war on European soil in the past 80 years forces us to acknowledge that our default expectations for global order, self-determination and the rule of law are luxurious illusions.

The war in Ukraine occupies three dimensions: military, cyber and economic.

The military conflict is hopelessly asymmetric. Ukraine is not a NATO member. Preventing it from becoming one is a primary goal for Russia. Putin has threatened nuclear retaliation if any NATO members join the conflict, squelching direct Western intervention.

The cyber conflict is more balanced, pitting the Russian intelligence community against a shadow coalition. In cyber battles everything is plausibly deniable. This provides more maneuvering room for hacking Russian assets.

Retaliation by non-state actors is also a wild card. There are 250,000 IT workers in Ukraine seeking avenues to resist, and many online hacker groups have vowed to target Russia. When the shooting ends, computer espionage may still cause serious problems if (when) Putin attempts to turn Ukraine into a vassal state.

Economic warfare has been the favored tool for Western politicians for decades. Do sanctions work? They did not deter Russia from invading Georgia in 2008, supporting Assad in Syria or annexing Crimea in 2014. They also have failed to effect regime change in Venezuela and Iran.

Advocates say this time is different. mainstream media are particularly eager to predict massive consequences, using hyperbole like “economic collapse.” Isolating Russia’s banks and freezing her foreign reserves are significant moves. To sanction-proof its economy, Russia had increased its central bank reserves to over $750 billion. Over half of those funds have now been frozen, reducing Putin’s ability to counter sanctions with subsidies.

Targeting oil and gas, Russia’s largest industry by far, is still the biggest arrow in the sanctions quiver. This week the Biden Administration announced a ban on fossil fuels from Russia. Unfortunately, the US only consumes 5% of Russian oil production.

The UK announced a ban on Russian oil, but not on coal or natural gas. The EU announced it will not participate. Germany relies on Russia for 55% of gas imports, 50% of coal and 35% of oil.

Energy is Putin’s biggest weapon and his weakness. The tension between energy independence, fear of inflation and efforts to decarbonize has never been starker.

A notorious Chinese curse says, “may you live in interesting times.” This invasion confirms that we live in an era of dramatic realignment. Autocrats are playing offense, emboldened by growing surveillance powers and the cultural divisions that bedevil free societies. One thing that hasn’t changed is Vladimir Putin.